Political government of Switzerland

Article by Jean Ziegler, former Federal Councillor

Switzerland is a small federative state in the middle of Europe, covering an area of about 16.000 square miles (41 000 km2) and with a population of 7'000'000 inhabitants.

For many centuries, in fact from the Middle Age to the 19th century, it has been only a Union or League of states of very limited size. Switzerland only constituted itself into a state in 1848. Since then, it has developed a rather interesting political machinery.

Swiss Federalism

Switzerland presents, every allowance being made, a similar structure to that of the United States. It is an assemblage of cantons, like the Union is an assemblage of states. Therefore there are a Swiss State and 26 cantonal States. What distinguishes federalism from other systems is the juridical character of these cantonal states, principally the various details which make them different from mere departments, like the French departments for example.

The juridical existence of the cantons is guaranteed fairly firmly. All the cantons are mentioned in article 1 of the Federal Constitution. It means that a revision of the Federal Constitution is needed in the case of the creation or the suppression of a canton. And for such a revision, a national referendum is necessary, requiring the majority of the people's votes and a majority of votes in a majority of cantons. It is also necessary that the local population has accepted the creation of a new canton. All that explains why the number of cantons has hardly been altered since 1848. The alteration of the number of cantons can only result from partitions or amalgamations of existing cantons. After 30 years of unceasing efforts, the creation of a new canton, the Jura, in the French speaking and catholic Northern part of canton Berne, was achieved in 1978.

All the cantons have their own constitution. The cantons have a fairly large freedom in the elaboration of their constitution. They are simply requested to be republics and to respect the principle of equality and the civil rights. But the consequence of such a similitude of political thought is that the cantons have given themselves rather similar institutions. There is no great difference between the public law both of Zurich and Lucerne: at the most may we verify some variations in the use of referendum and in the extent of the autonomy of the communes.

The cantons take part in the moulding of the federal will. For example, for a revision of the Federal Constitution, one proceeds to a compulsory national referendum for which the majority of the votes of the people and the majority of the cantons are required. Four times, since 1970, a revision has failed because, though the majority of the votes of the people was in favour of it, the majority of the cantons was against it. The small cantons, as it is easy to guess, had kept at bay more populous cantons. It thus happened when it was contemplated to give the Confederation new competencies on fiscal matters (1970), on school legislation (1973), on economic policy (1975) and on energy problems (1983).

Furthermore, and this is well-known, every canton sends a deputation of two members to the Council of the States. In other words, our bicameral Parliament is a copy of the US Congress, and the Council of the States of the Senate. And one can notice, generally speaking, that the latter plays a moderating, even conservative part in our legislation.

Lastly, all the cantons are entitled to send initiatives to the Federal Parliament.

But the main feature of federalism is the distribution of competencies. The cantons have state competencies. They can, in some spheres, legislate. The spheres are divided by the Federal Constitution, and the cantons have all the powers which are not assigned to the Confederation (article 3 of the Constitution). One must recognise that the Confederation has been given, in a century, very numerous competencies. But the competencies left to the cantons are far from negligible. The cantons have extensive powers in the fields of education, public health, commercial policy, town and country planning, maintenance of law and order, and judiciary system. It is difficult to say whether the Swiss cantons have retained their legislative powers. For example our cantons have no longer any competencies in civil law, and hardly any in criminal law. But they have some competencies in fiscal matter. And, above all, expensive honour, they are entrusted with the carrying out of the federal laws.

Besides, the vitality of our cantons does not depend only on juridical texts. Between the Confederation and the cantons, an almost permanent procedure of concentration has been established. It means that, even in the accomplish­ment of its own competencies, the Confederation regularly takes the advice of the cantons' governments. And it is doubtful that the Confederation would stick to a project that meets with the strong opposition of some of the cantons.

Swiss Government

Government means here sensu lato the organisation of the powers of the Confederation.

The Constitution of 1848, revised in 1874 and 1999, has established three main organs: the Federal Assembly or Parliament; the Federal Council or Government sensu stricto and the Federal Court of Justice. Our system obviously draws its inspiration of the concept of the separation of powers.

The Federal Assembly

Our Federal Parliament consists of two Houses.

The House of the People, called National Council, has 200 members allotted, between the cantons, in proportion of the population. The allotment is re-examined every ten years. The deputies are elected for a period of four years, according to the system of the proportional representation. Each canton (at large) represents a constituency. Therefore some cantons elect, altogether, more than 30 deputies, others only 2 or 3. In the cantons which return only one member, the majority vote (first past the post) is obvious.

The Federate House is called the Council of the States, with 46 members, two for each canton, one for each half canton. These deputies are designated according to the cantonal law. They are, generally, elected by the people, for a period of four years, by the system of the two rounds majority vote. Their prestige is slightly superior to that of the National Councillors.

The history, the boundaries of the cantons and the electoral system have had as a consequence the existence of many political parties. The three most important parties are the radical, the social-democrat and the Christian-democrat parties (contrary to what happened in Germany, Austria and Italy, the radical liberal party has remained powerful: the permanency of radicalism is even one of the peculiarities of Swiss politics).

There is also an agrarian party, now called Swiss People's party, which defends the interests of agriculture and handicraft. Finally, ten small parties, and among those a nationalist party and the communist party. The four great parties have, at the National Council, more than 170 seats each on a total of 200 seats. The communist party has only two seats.

The National Council gives a rather true picture of the electorate, in spite of the reapportionment in cantons. On the contrary, the Council of the States, because of the system of the majority vote, comprises few social-democrats and many radicals and Christian democrats.

The two Houses have strictly the same powers: they legislate, approve treaties, vote the budget and the loans, and supervise the Federal Council and the Administration. They elect, in a plenary session, the members of the Federal Council and the Federal Judges.

The Federal Council

The Federal Council is our Executive college.

The councillors are elected, every four years, by the Federal Assembly (the two Houses united in a plenary session). The election requires the majority of votes for each seat separately. It may happen, that four or five rounds of voting for one seat are necessary. But usually, the outgoing councillors are reelected many times without any trouble. Since 1959, the major parties of the Federal Assembly have come to an agreement in order to constitute a coalition government, consisting of two social-democrats, two radicals, two Christian-democrats and one agrarian. This combination being established, the unforeseen lies only in the elected personalities. In 1973, for example, the three official candidates of the parties for the three vacancies were beaten by three outsiders. In 1984 the first woman was elected. She resigned in 1989. Another woman was elected in 1993 and a third one in 1999.

Then the Council is a college of equals. Of course, there is a President of the Confederation, who changes every year, but his principal task consists in presiding over the sittings of the Council. In the case of a tie, he has a casting vote. But that is all, and it is quite obvious that he himself does not establish the political line of the Government, as the Prime Minister of Great Britain or the German Chancellor does.

The introduction of the election of the Federal Councillors by the people has been sometimes suggested. But the idea has been given up because of the difficulty to apply it to a plurality of magistrates, and because one would not know easily how to protect the French and Italian speaking minorities. In return, there never was any talk of giving up the "college" and replacing it by one person only. The Swiss has a profound suspicion towards personal power.

The Federal Council has the customary competencies bestowed on a modern government. It controls the policy of the country, prepares the new legis­lation, negotiates and ratifies the treaties, appoints civil servants and checks their activity. It also controls the activity of the cantons.

Our Cabinet does not resign, when outvoted by the Parliament. We do not make use of the vote of censure or the interpellation, as it is generally done in parliamentary system. Besides few are the Councillors who resign from their office for political reasons. It has sometimes happened after the negative result of a referendum (in 1891, 1934, and 1953) or because of serious discord among the councillors. Of course, the Executive cannot either declare the dissolution of Parliament. Here again, we do not possess the classical tool of parliamentary government.

The Executive cannot veto the bills of Parliament. One must recognise that it has many other means to influence the legislative work of the Houses, without necessarily being given this one. Besides, the referendum is another kind of veto.

Finally, the Parliament has no power of impeachment. Naturally, a councillor may not be reelected at the beginning of the next period of function (in fact it has not happened since 1872). But the Parliament cannot dismiss a councillor during a term of function.

The Federal Court of Justice

It belongs principally to the cantons to dispense justice; even when it comes to apply federal statutes. But the constituent has place, above all, a unique Federal Court of Justice entrusted with the control of the unity of interpretation of the Federal Law. Thus the Federal Court of Justice insures the uniformity of the civil and the criminal codes, which are both federal statutes. The 39 judges are elected, for a period of 6 years, by the Federal Assembly, and re-eligible many times.

The cantonal courts and the federal court can declare unconstitutional the cantonal law. In return, neither the federal court of justice nor any other authority may criticise the constitutionality of the federal statutes. Our Federal Court of Justice, in this respect, is neither a "Supreme Court" (USA) nor a "Bundesverfassungsgericht" (D), nor a "Conseil constitutionnel" (F).

Swiss Democracy

All Swiss aged 18, men and women, have voting rights in federal matters. One knows that it took us a considerable time to give women their voting rights. And now that it has been done, in 1971, one no longer understands why such a natural reform has required so many efforts.

The powers of the electors are, indeed, more extensive than in many a country.

First of all, and it is normal, the electors elect the members of the National Council. The members of the Council of the States are elected according to the cantonal law.

But the electors have immediate rights on the Constitution and the bills: 100'000 electors can request, by way of an initiative, a total or partial revision of the Constitution. The signatures backing the initiative must be collected in a period of 18 months. And any such revision is submitted to a vote or compulsory referendum of the people and the cantons; in other words, the referendum must obtain both the majority of the people, in the whole of Switzerland, and the majority of votes in a majority of cantons (12 out of 23). Finally, the bills, and even certain international treaties, are submitted to the vote of the people, if requested by 50'000 electors in a delay of 100 days reckoning from the publication.

Here are some statistical information:

In federal matters, electors have taken part, since 1848, in 471 polls. In other words, they were able, 471 times, to express their opinion on a proposal by saying yes or no. In 196 cases, the object of the vote was a revision of the Constitution and, in 137 cases, the adoption of a bill or the approval of a treaty. In constitutional matters, the answer was positive in 141 cases and negative in 55 cases. In legislative and conventional matters, positive in 68 cases and negative in 69 cases. Membership of the League of Nations was accepted in 1920 but membership of the United Nations was rejected in 1986 by a 3 to 1 majority. Joining the European Economic Area was rejected by 50,3 % of the voters on December 6th 1992 (only 7 out of 23 cantons were in favour).

As to the popular initiative, which can lead only to the revision of the Constitution and not of the bills, more than 200 were brought in since the end of the last century. 127 have been submitted to a referendum of which 12 have been accepted and 115 rejected. Some 70 have been withdrawn, mostly because the authorities had more or less favourably answered the wishes of the initiators, and lastly some 30 are pending.

But, among all these figures, the most accusatory are those of the turnout.

The turnout seldom exceeds 40%, it even comes down sometimes below 30%. It means that important projects are accepted or rejected by less than 20% of the citizens. Alone the two referendums on foreign population have enticed many electors because the minds were over-excited (75% in 1970, 70% in 1974). But the vote on the conjunctural policy interested only 30% (1975) and the vote concerning the rights of the workers in the management of enterprises hardly 40% (1976). Recently some votes on fundamental issues have interested many voters: a turnout of 69% was registered when the initiative for the abolition of the Army was voted (1989) and 79 % when membership of the European Economic Area was decided (1992).

This unconcern is rather disheartening, but no one sees clearly what we could do to fight it. If the citizens abstain, it comes mostly from the fact that they do not any longer under­stand the questions proposed to them. And one must confess that our consti­tutional revisions and our statutes have become so intricate, so subtle, so fluctuating, that they escape the understanding of most of the electors. As long as the juridical style has not been altered, or as long as the very texts are submitted to the people in their definite form (that is ready for insertion in the compendium of laws), one must not expect a better understanding and a more important participation.

Absenteeism, besides, has another ground. Only the constitutional basis and the statutes, in other words rather abstract rules, are submitted to the vote of the people. But the people are more interested in the examples of enforcement or in concrete decisions. We have noticed that very clearly as far as national roads and nuclear-power stations are concerned. When the fundamental principles of the federal competence have been inscribed in the Constitution, in 1957 and 1958, the electors voted yes in a total unconcern and without knowing exactly what they were doing. When the bills of execution were passed, in 1959 and 1960, which settled the procedure of the building of the roads and nuclear-power stations, nobody has even required a referendum. But now that we have reached the effective stage of the building of the said roads and nuclear-power stations, then the problem excites the public opinion but it is too late for a vote. And we are really faced with a cruel dilemma. Either we stick to the present system and the citizens will reproach us not to have questioned them on subjects near to their heart. Or, from now on, we submit to their approval all the decrees of application and thus run the risk of not being able to lead a coherent policy. These problems have led to popular initiatives. They were related to road building in 1978 and nuclear power in 1979 and 1984, and were rejected.

Final considerations

The first noticeable feature, when one tries to describe the political system of Switzerland, is its amazing stability. The Parliament offers nearly the same aspect since 1919. There are four great parties, each with about 40 seats at the National Council, and when one of these gains 10 seats or the other loses 5 seats, one almost talks of a landslide: a normal election seldom shift more than half a dozen seats. This steadiness is due to our electoral system, the proportional representation: there is no better method to break the shocks. As a natural consequence, the parliamentary elections do not lead, like in Great Britain, in France or in Germany, to a variation of the governmental orientation. They only amount to confirm the political staff, while discarding a few spoilsports or a few incompetents, and to give very slight information about the mood of the people.

As to the Cabinet, its composition is the same since 1960, and this cannot be said of any other democratic state.

Quite a few maintain that this stability is only specious and that it hides poorly a subjacent uneasiness. Of course, everything may change one day, and even quite suddenly if, for example, unemployment was to spread steadily (3 % 1n 1994). But I believe that, today, appearances do not deceive. The Swiss people are more conservative than ever. They have shown this tendency in many votes and one must not push the paradox so far as to saying that, the quieter a water is, the more it boils underneath.

It remains to be seen if stability is a political quality. After all, I believe it is, at least in a country such as ours. Of course, the real wrongs we notice here and there are hard to eradicate, the Swiss people being hardly filled with the spirit of the Crusaders. But we are in possession of substantial liberties, and it would be dangerous to question these in a desire of perfection.

The second feature that describes well our system is the relative weakening of Parliament. Our Parliament of amateurs and semi-professionals is wedged between the Federal Council which has at its disposal all the resources of the Administration, - and the people who can, whenever it pleases them, cancel its decisions. In other words, the Parliament is not the sole author of the bills and, whenever it adopts them, it has, where the referendum is possible, not even the last word. Doubtless, one must not darken the picture. As the existence of the Government does not depend on the fate reserved to its projects, the Parliament can freely amend those, without calling forth a political crisis; and it certainly does not hesitate to do so. And, as the referendary campaigns are expensive, the dissatisfied persons cannot set themselves against all the decrees. Nevertheless, our Parliament suffers, as most other Parliaments in the world, of the reinforcement of the Executive' powers and means; and it also suffers, in a way more specific to our country, of the development of direct democracy.

The third feature is the organisation of our society. In Switzerland, there is a multiplicity of groups, associations, intermediate bodies, each with their own interests to defend before the Government. Not an ordinary "lobbyism" such as we notice in other states; and there would be nothing very remarkable about it. But, once again, direct democracy alters the features of the best well-known phenomena. Many intermediate bodies, because of their numerous members, may reinforce their pressure with the threat of an impending referendum. And one hears often the same complaint: the referendum would only serve, preventively, to give weight to the proposals of certain "lobbies". To this grievance, there is only one answer. The political authorities must accept, more often than they do today, to displease the economic associations and to face the risks of a referendum. After all, a referendum honourably lost is not humiliating; and a referendum won by Parliament over its adversaries could bring the proof, very valuable indeed, that certain threats weigh less than it would have seemed at first.